Current File : //proc/self/root/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/ubuntu-helpers
# Lenient profile that is intended to be used when 'Ux' is desired but
# does not provide enough environment sanitizing. This effectively is an
# open profile that blacklists certain known dangerous files and also
# does not allow any capabilities. For example, it will not allow 'm' on files
# owned be the user invoking the program. While this provides some additional
# protection, please use with care as applications running under this profile
# are effectively running without any AppArmor protection. Use this profile
# only if the process absolutely must be run (effectively) unconfined.
#
# Usage:
# Because this abstraction defines the sanitized_helper profile, it must only
# be included once. Therefore this abstraction should typically not be
# included in other abstractions so as to avoid parser errors regarding
# multiple definitions.
#
# Limitations:
# 1. This does not work for root owned processes, because of the way we use
# owner matching in the sanitized helper. We could do a better job with
# this to support root, but it would make the policy harder to understand
# and going unconfined as root is not desirable any way.
#
# 2. For this sanitized_helper to work, the program running in the sanitized
# environment must open symlinks directly in order for AppArmor to mediate
# it. This is confirmed to work with:
# - compiled code which can load shared libraries
# - python imports
# It is known not to work with:
# - perl includes
# 3. Sanitizing ruby and java
#
# Use at your own risk. This profile was developed as an interim workaround for
# LP: #851986 until AppArmor utilizes proper environment filtering.
abi <abi/3.0>,
profile sanitized_helper {
include <abstractions/base>
include <abstractions/X>
# Allow all networking
network inet,
network inet6,
# Allow all DBus communications
include <abstractions/dbus-session-strict>
include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
dbus,
# Needed for Google Chrome
ptrace (trace) peer=**//sanitized_helper,
# Allow exec of anything, but under this profile. Allow transition
# to other profiles if they exist.
/{usr/,usr/local/,}{bin,sbin}/* Pixr,
# Allow exec of libexec applications in /usr/lib* and /usr/local/lib*
/usr/{,local/}lib*/{,**/}* Pixr,
# Allow exec of software-center scripts. We may need to allow wider
# permissions for /usr/share, but for now just do this. (LP: #972367)
/usr/share/software-center/* Pixr,
# Allow exec of texlive font build scripts (LP: #1010909)
/usr/share/texlive/texmf{,-dist}/web2c/{,**/}* Pixr,
# While the chromium and chrome sandboxes are setuid root, they only link
# in limited libraries so glibc's secure execution should be enough to not
# require the santized_helper (ie, LD_PRELOAD will only use standard system
# paths (man ld.so)).
/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-browser-sandbox PUxr,
/usr/lib/chromium{,-browser}/chrome-sandbox PUxr,
/opt/google/chrome{,-beta,-unstable}/chrome-sandbox PUxr,
/opt/google/chrome{,-beta,-unstable}/google-chrome Pixr,
/opt/google/chrome{,-beta,-unstable}/chrome Pixr,
/opt/google/chrome{,-beta,-unstable}/chrome_crashpad_handler Pixr,
/opt/google/chrome{,-beta,-unstable}/{,**/}lib*.so{,.*} m,
# The same is needed for Brave
/opt/brave.com/brave{,-beta,-dev,-nightly}/chrome-sandbox PUxr,
/opt/brave.com/brave{,-beta,-dev,-nightly}/brave-browser{,-beta,-dev,-nightly} Pixr,
/opt/brave.com/brave{,-beta,-dev,-nightly}/brave Pixr,
/opt/brave.com/brave{,-beta,-dev,-nightly}/{,**/}lib*.so{,.*} m,
# Full access
/ r,
/** rwkl,
/{,usr/,usr/local/}lib{,32,64}/{,**/}*.so{,.*} m,
# Dangerous files
audit deny owner /**/* m, # compiled libraries
audit deny owner /**/*.py* r, # python imports
}
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